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Abstract

The Diaoyu Islands are a small, uninhabited archipelago in the East China Sea which has begun
increasing in strategic significance due to its advantageous location near Taiwan and along the
First Island Chain. The islands are currently under Japanese administration, but the People’s
Republic of China considers them historically Chinese and contests Japan’s claim to the islands.
A careful examination of China’s actions in challenging Japan’s rule over the Diaoyus reveals
the influence of the Thirty-Six Stratagems, a tome of ancient Chinese military wisdom which
provides a framework onto which China’s current strategy corresponds. This thesis examines the
historical and cultural influence of the Thirty-Six Stratagems and maps the wisdom onto China’s
actions in the Diaoyus. Thus, projection of future strategy and deterring actions can be developed
to discourage Chinese belligerence in the East China Sea.
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Influence of the Thirty-Six Stratagems on Chinese Strategy in the Diaoyu Islands
The use of force has been a feature of international relations since its conception, as
conflict is fundamental to the human condition. As such, many different theories on force and
war have been developed and endure to this day. The West will immediately name its own—
Clausewitz’s On War, or Beaufre’s Strategy for Tomorrow. The West’s imagination portrays
military might as an extension of politics and governmental will, and thus relegates the
influences of military strategy to this arena. There is, however, another work of strategy perhaps
more influential than those previously mentioned, because of its suffusion into the mentality of
the society which spawned it. The Thirty-Six Stratagems, a collection of strategy wisdom
complied during the 16th century, can be found influencing every aspect of Chinese life—
imagine indoctrinated military strategy with the ubiquity of “Mary Had a Little Lamb”.1 The
wisdom writings particularly influence China’s encompassing approach to the Diaoyu Islands, an
uninhabited archipelago contested by China, Japan, and Taiwan. The stratagems are foundational
to both of China’s views of the islands— as a boon to its own ambitions and a threatening
advantage to adversaries.
The Thirty-Six Stratagems in Perspective
Though not as widely known in Western society as the Art of War, the Thirty-Six
Stratagems are no less influential. While they are ostensibly a collection of military wisdom
from the Warring States era, they are more analogous to nursery rhymes or folklore in terms of
their influence. They embody and teach the values of their respective culture, and are ingrained

1

Harro Von Senger, 36 Strategems for Business. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International (Asia)
Private Limited, 2007. Accessed January 5, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central. p. 3.
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into the collective unconscious.2 Furthermore, each is written using only four characters— a
device designed to make them short and easily memorable.3 It is unknown exactly how the
modern form of the Thirty-Six Stratagems came about, but it is thought to be a collected and
edited compilation of wise sayings and stories from the Warring States period— approximately
481 BC to 221 BC. Some of the stratagems originate from folk tales of military conquests or
blunders, such as “Besiege Wei to Rescue Zhao” derived from a campaign in 354 BC.4 Others
appear fully formed, such as “Await an Exhausted Enemy at One’s Ease” which can be traced
back to Sun Tzu.5
The word ‘stratagem’ is easily confused with ‘strategy’ especially in the context of these
thirty-six. While they are similar, a strategy refers to an overarching approach to an issue, usually
planned out in advance. Stratagem, on the other hand, refers to a trick or deception used; a
departure from expected behavior to achieve one’s ends. This is a foreign concept to Westerners,
as cunning, deceit, and tricks all have negative connotations. Not so for Eastern cultures, and
especially not the Thirty-Six Stratagems. Herro von Senger, a Swiss Sinologist, helps dispel the
unfavorable perception of trickery. He observes, “knowledge of stratagem is therefore the
rationally structured ability to deviate from the routine, oriented toward problem-solving and
based on cunning.”6

2

Laurence J. Brahm, Negotiating in China: 36 Strategies (Hong Kong: NAGA Group, 1996), p. xii.

3
Harro Von Senger, 36 Strategems for Business. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International (Asia)
Private Limited, 2007. Accessed January 5, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central.
4

Stefan Verstappen, The Thirty-Six Strategies of Ancient China. San Francisco, CA: China Books, 1999. p.

5

Senger, 36 Strategems for Business. p. 24.

6

Ibid., p. 13.
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As such, the Thirty-Six Stratagems are best used when conventional strategy is
inadequate, necessitating a different approach. These ruses work well against the West, due to
the previously mentioned aversion to craftiness. As the West’s own military strategist, Carl von
Clausewitz, writes, “The weaker the powers of the strategic leader become, the more open he
will be to cunning, so that cunning presents itself as a last resort to the very weak and small, for
whom caution and wisdom no longer suffice, to the point where all skill appears to have deserted
him.”7 Clausewitz’s opinion of cunning is not the well-thought-out trickery of the Thirty-Six
Stratagems, but of an instinctual amateur. This is consistent with Clausewitz’s overall theory of
warfare. He views battle as something to be approached with overwhelming might, ended
quickly and decisively. The adage, “the Chinese emphasize stratagems, Westerners emphasize
force,” is largely true throughout Western thought and strategy, thus American susceptibility to
the Thirty-Six Stratagems.8
This asymmetricity is how the stratagems are designed— and as previously mentioned,
these artifices are fundamental to Chinese thought, and individuals brought up in this culture
have the Thirty-Six Stratagems ingrained. The stratagems are not limited to strictly warfare;
applications can range from business, politics, and everyday life. They form a common language
of cunning as well— “Extreme sensitivity to cunning, characteristic of much of the Chinese
population…acts like a protective shield. In nine out of ten cases, the suspicion of a trick might
prove unfounded, but in the tenth case it might protect the subject from harm.”9 While protective,

7

Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1918), p. 8.

8

Senger, 36 Strategems for Business, p. 14.

9

Ibid., p. 12.
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this mindset also fosters heuristical mirror-imaging— as China expects such cunning, they
perceive it in all others, especially from foreigners. For example, a book was published in China
examining the business strategy of Cisco, the Californian computer company, in light of the
stratagems.10 Von Senger argues this is evidence of a “cognitive analytical web that the Chinese
cast over reality— be it Chinese or foreign— in order to…interpret it from a stratagemic point of
view.”11
Thus, it is no surprise to see glimpses of these foundational webs in the grand strategy of
the Chinese Communist Party. Although the Thirty-Six Stratagems are thought to have originated
as an oral tradition, a written version by an unknown author was discovered in 1941 in the
Shaanxi province.12 It was then printed and widely circulated by a local publisher, simultaneous
with the growth of the Chinese Communist Party in influence and power.13 It is no surprise, then,
to find these stratagems have been and continue to be influential to a prominent section of the
Party. Michael Pillsbury refers to this segment as the ying pai— nationalist generals, strategists,
and politicians.14 He asserts that “internal Chinese government planning documents [show] how
the Chinese explicitly use the ancient axioms” in formulating grand strategy.15 It should be no

10
Yi Mou, “Ba Sike yu ‘sanshiliu ji’ yiqi chao” [“Cisco and ‘the 36 stratagems’ brought together”], QXS ,
no. 2, 2004.
11

Senger, 36 Strategems for Business, p. 31.

Raluca Enescu, “The Thirty-Six Stratagems, with Examples from across History,” Medium (History of
Yesterday, August 2, 2021), https://historyofyesterday.com/the-thirty-six-stratagems-with-examples-from-acrosshistory-a16c25ee4814.
12

13

Ibid.

14

Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the
Global Superpower (Griffin, 2016), p. 33.
15

Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon, p. 33.
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surprise, then, that China examines the Diaoyu Islands through this lens, and seeks to leverage
the situation in their favor.
Diaoyu or Senkaku?
The Diaoyus islands are contested by the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of China, and
Japan. As such, the archipelago has three names— they are referred to as 尖閣 (Senkaku) in
Japanese, 钓鱼 (Diaoyus) by the PRC, and 釣魚臺 (Diaoyutai) by the ROC. As there is not
international legal consensus on which nation the territory belongs to, there is not an
internationally accepted name. It is acknowledged by the U.S. that the islands are under Japanese
control in Article 5 of the U.S. Japan Security Treaty, and furthermore they are administered by
the Japanese Government.16 However, this thesis is focused on China’s conception of the islands,
and as such will refer to them as the Diaoyus.
Additionally, it is also acknowledged that the Republic of China lays claim to the islands.
However, the People’s Republic of China considers Taiwan a province under their jurisdiction
and does not recognize their authority. Again, as this thesis is focused on the PRC’s view of the
Diaoyus, it will not deeply examine Taiwan’s claims to the islands.
The Diaoyus in Context of the First Island Chain
The Diaoyus are a small part of a much larger grouping of islands in the Pacific, thus its
strategic location must be considered in context of the broader First Island Chain. This moniker
refers to one of two archipelagoes of islands in the Western Pacific (See Figure One). Although
the islands included under the umbrella of the First Island Chain can vary, it is generally thought

Bert Chapman, “Geopolitical Implications of the Sino-Japanese East China Sea Dispute for the U.S.,”
Geopolitics, History, and International Relations 9, no. 2 (2017): p. 15, https://doi.org/10.22381/ghir9220172, p. 19.
16
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to consist of the Japanese home islands, Japan’s Ryukyu chain, Taiwan, the islands of the South
China Sea, and the Philippines.17 This group sweeps along the coastline of mainland Asia and is
primarily a strategic conception, applicable when one nation or alliance has control of the entire
chain. Militarily, the islands function as immobile, unsinkable aircraft carriers and can be used to
enforce efficient blockades— due to its proximity to the mainland, it enables control of naval
traffic to and from East Asia.

Toshi Yoshihara, “China's Vision of Its Seascape: The First Island Chain and Chinese Seapower,” Asian
Politics & Policy 4, no. 3 (2012): pp. 293-314, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1943-0787.2012.01349.x.
17
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Figure 1. The First and Second Island Chains in the Western Pacific 18

The grouping of these islands into chains originated as a Chinese strategy concept. It
posited Beijing as the locus of a maritime Asia and visualized the chains spreading outward from
Chinese ports.19 This school of thought originally coined the terms First and Second Island
Chain, and was primarily defensive or exploratory in nature. From a Sino-centric vantage point,
18

Yoshihara, “China's Vision of Its Seascape,” p. 295.

19

Ibid., p. 294.
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the islands parallel nearly all of China’s coastline, thus “[infusing] the island chain concept with
tangible geospatial meaning and unity.”20 This model of the Pacific slowly began to leak into
Western sphere in the late 1980s due to the work of You Ji and You Xu, Chinese scholars at
Australian National University.21
As China’s conception of the First Island Chain began to trickle into Western thought, an
exchange occurred whereby each side examined the model in light of the other’s strategy. For
American theorists, China’s outward gaze could be represented by the sea lanes the islands
formed. Naval strategist Bernard Cole argues that PLA Navy desires to command both chains
and view them as tangible features which define their operational capabilities.22 He ultimately
dismisses the conception as too tainted by China’s continentalism: “It violates the central tenet of
classic maritime strategy that while the soldier thinks of terrain and theaters, the sailor of
necessity thinks in wider terms outside immediate physical limits— there is no ‘terrain’ at sea.”23
On the other side of the ocean, Chinese theorists were much more concerned by
America’s view of the island chains. Its intended use, to box in Sino-Soviet influence,
“reinforced long-standing Chinese interpretations of hostile American intentions towards
China.”24 The stakes are higher for China as well— contrast their doomsday scenario with
America’s. Should the PLA control the First Island Chain, it would likely mark the end of

20

Yoshihara, “China's Vision of Its Seascape,” p. 294.

21

Ibid.

22

Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy in the 21st Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute, 2010), p. 177.
23

Ibid.

24

Yoshihara, “China's Vision of Its Seascape,” p. 296.
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significant US influence in the Pacific and downgrade America from a global to a regional
hegemon. A momentous loss, but one which ends with the U.S. intact as a nation. However, U.S.
control of the First Island Chain represents a historically existential threat to China through the
avenue they fear most— the sea.
As with much of the world, China’s strategy is heavily influenced by history and
geography. It is one of the oldest civilizations in the world, as ancient farmers settled the fertile
North China Plain, where the Yellow and Yangtze rivers arrive to the sea (See Figure Two).25
Much of Chinese history, beginning in the Warring States period, has sought to control or protect
the plain— The Great Wall was built to keep the hordes from Manchuria easily crossing into the
flatland.26 As China expanded west, it controlled the Xinjiang region as a buffer, and the
Himalayas and Tibet are a formidable mountain border. The mountains continue south, fencing
off what is now Myanmar and Laos. Until the 19th century, China was very secure as these
mountains and arduous distances discouraged adversaries.27 Then, the Europeans brought war via
the sea— something China had never had to contend with.
At one point China commanded the largest fleet at any point in history— the Treasure
Fleet consisted of 1,700 massive nine-mast vessels at its peak in the 14th century. However, the
fleet was disbanded over fears of the trade it enabled with other nations. It became a crime to

25
Ling Zhang. “Pre-1048: Prelude to the Environmental Drama.” The River, the Plain, and the State: An
Environmental Drama in Northern Song China, 1048–1128 (2016), 21–138. Studies in Environment and History.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Alan Williams. “The Great Wall of China by Claire Roberts and Geremie R Barmie.” Art Book 16, no. 3
(August 2009): 76–77. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8357.2009.01050_2.x
26

27

Ibid.
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even sail, and China disavowed foreign trade for the next 500 years.28 As mentioned, the
Europeans arrived and exploited this weakness to force trade. The Chinese were embarrassed in
the Opium Wars with Britain, only for Japan to invade both Manchuria and the prized North
China Plain during World War II.29 China has never forgotten this humiliation, and thus the
formulation of its grand strategy and fixation on the First Island Chain and broader Pacific.
Allowing another Western power to control and threaten China from the sea represents a
colossal failure to Beijing. Not only for the previously mentioned historical grievances because
Chinese strategy is predicated on avoiding encirclement, as shown by the board game wei qi. A
widely popular, traditional Chinese game, it can be translated as “encirclement board.”30 The
players do not seek to annihilate each other, but rather to unite their pieces and surround their
adversary’s. When presented with an antagonist who seeks encircle, as China perceives America
intends to do in the Pacific, it is strategically beneficial to break through such containment before
it is used against them.
Appraisal of the Strategic Significance of the Diaoyus
Admiral Alfred Mahan, one of history’s greatest naval strategy, wrote that the “portions
of the earth’s surface, and their consequent interest to mankind, differ from time to time.”31 This
is especially true of the Diaoyus. For much of history, the uninhabited islands were an
afterthought, changing hands between China and Japan. However, islands are given strategic
Jeremy Smith, “The Fall of China's Treasure Fleet,” Business Insights: Global, April 2002.
https://bi.gale.com/global/article/GALE%7CA178896597?u=vic_liberty&sid=summon
28

29

Rossen Vassilev, "China's Opium Wars: Britain as the World's First Narco-State." New Politics 13, no. 1
(Summer, 2010): p. 75.
30

Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon. p. 45.

31

Alfred Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (Forgotten Books, 2018).
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significance not by geographic position alone, but also by the geopolitical situations around
them. Mahan correctly predicted that Cuba would occupy increasing prominence in American
strategic thinking, which came true during the Cold War and ultimately the Cuban Missile
Crisis.32
Such is the state of affairs surrounding the Diaoyus. The group of islands are uninhabited
and sporadically visited due to their mountainous nature. The five main islands are 钓鱼
(Diaoyu), 赤尾 (Chiwei), 黄尾 (Huangwei), 北小 (Beixiao), and 南小 (Nanxiao) [See Figure
Three]. Three smaller islets are little more than rocky outcroppings— 北 (Bei), 南 (Nan), and 飞
(Fei). Considering China’s increasing global ambitions and opposition to US dominance in
the Pacific, the islands are perfectly situated to provide Beijing an avenue to expand in both
aspirations. As it is contested by Japan, China, and Taiwan, a decisive claim to the territory by
the PRC would elevate their global standing in the international system while lending more
credibility to their claims in the South China Sea. Additionally, the Diaoyus are located at a
strategic point crucial to China’s economic and military access to the Pacific. As a final benefit,
the archipelago’s proximity to Taiwan would increase the PLA’s naval and aerial capabilities
directed at the ROC.33

32

Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, p. 7.

Eric Sayers, “The ‘Consequent Interest’ of Japan's Southwestern Islands,” Naval War College Review 66,
no. 2 (2013): p. 45.
33
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Figure 2. Map of the Western Pacific with the Diaoyu Islands highlighted 34

Mahan’s formula to appraise the value of islands is threefold— its proximity to important
sea lines of communication, its ability to defend itself, and its resources.35 The Diaoyus are
strong contenders in all three considerations. The archipelago is central to China’s commercial
shipping— Shanghai, Ningbo, and Hong Kong all send seaborne traffic bound for North
Michael Lipin, Alison Klein, and Dino Beslagic, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands - an Interactive Map,”
VOA (The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands - An Interactive Map, December 12, 2016),
https://www.voanews.com/a/senkaku-diaoyu-islands-map/3632772.html.
34

35

Alfred. T. Mahan and Allan F. Westcott, Mahan on Naval Warfare: Selections from the Writing of Rear
Admiral Alfred T. Mahan (Lavergne, TN, 2013).
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America through the Miyako Straits (See Figure Four).36 Approximately a quarter of SinoAmerican trade travels through the straits, and the route is nearly a thousand kilometers shorter
than alternative routes.37 The strait is also a strategic access point to the larger Pacific for China’s
East Sea Fleet, whose headquarters are also in Ningbo. The Diaoyus’ mountainous nature,
particularly 钓鱼岛 (Diaoyu Island), renders them excellent for withstanding rocket or missile
attacks.38 Finally, the waters around the islands are incredibly resource-saturated— the U.S.
Energy Information Administration estimates there could be over 100 million barrels’ worth of
petroleum and natural gas nearby.39 The combination of these factors only serve to raise the
strategic value of the Diaoyus. Though attention has only shifted onto them recently, it’s no
surprise the islands have been a source of contention between China and Japan for quite some
time.
Brief History of China and Japan’s Claims to the Diaoyus
The Diaoyus’ history begins with the establishment of the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1429,
stretching from the Amami Islands in the north to the Sakishima Islands in the south.40 The
kingdom paid tribute to both the Japanese shogun and the Chinese emperor. This period lends
China its strongest claim to the Diaoyus, as during this period they were traditional fishing
36

Yoshihara, “China's Vision of Its Seascape,” p. 304.

Editorial Board. (2004). “China’s Sea Exit Problem Has Not Been Completely Resolved”
[中国的出海口 问题还没有彻底解决]. Water Transportation Digest [水路运输文摘], 11, 27–28.
37

38
Bert Chapman, “Geopolitical Implications of the Sino-Japanese East China Sea Dispute for the U.S.,”
Geopolitics, History, and International Relations 9, no. 2 (2017): p. 15, https://doi.org/10.22381/ghir9220172, p. 19.

“East China Sea.” International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Accessed January 20,
2022. https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/regions-of-interest/East_China_Sea.
39

Eric Sayers, “The ‘Consequent Interest’ of Japan's Southwestern Islands,” Naval War College Review 66,
no. 2 (2013): p. 46.
40
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grounds for Chinese and Taiwanese fishermen.41 Chinese historical records claim more than
tributary, however, and show the islands as part of China as early as the fifteenth century.42
However, in 1609 the Japanese Satsuma kingdom invaded and took control of the Ryukyus,
ruling them for several centuries.43
In 1872, the Japanese Meiji incorporated the Ryukyu Kingdom into the Prefecture of
Okinawa. Specific to the Diaoyus, China and Japan signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895
which transferred Taiwan and its affiliated islands to Japan.44 This arraignment stood until World
War II when the U.S. invaded Japan.45 China asserts that the Cairo Declaration, a joint statement
issued by China, the U.K., and the U.S., requires “all territories Japan has stolen from the
Chinese” including the Diaoyus be returned to Chinese possession.46 However, the greater
Ryukyus would remain under American administration during the reconstruction of Japan until
full sovereignty over the islands was conveyed back to Japan in 1972 who continue to administer
them today.47

41
Kristine Schenck, “China's Response to U.S.-Japan Coordination in the East China Sea,” Asia Policy 27,
no. 3 (2020): pp. 43-57, https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2020.0043, p. 5.
42

Ibid.

43

Sayers, “The ‘Consequent Interest’ of Japan's Southwestern Islands,” p. 46.

44

Chapman, “Geopolitical Implications of the Sino-Japanese East China Sea Dispute for the U.S.,” p. 19.

45

Sayers, “The ‘Consequent Interest’ of Japan's Southwestern Islands,” p. 46.

“The Diaoyu Islands: The Owner and the Thief.” Embassy of the People's Republic of China to
Denmark. Accessed January 20, 2022. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cedk/eng/ztbd/dydwt/t1036401.htm.
46

47

Ibid.
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Figure 3. Map of the Western Pacific with the Miyako Strait labeled 48

Chinese Actions in the Diaoyus
Although China had always staked a claim to the Diaoyus, domestic and political interest
was renewed in 2012 when Japan bought back the official rights to the three largest islands in the
archipelago— 钓鱼 (Diaoyu), 北小 (Beixiao), and 南小 (Nanxiao). They had been leased out to

48

The Straits Times (Singapore Press Holdings, n.d.), https://static.straitstimes.com.sg/s3fspublic/attachments/2016/08/16/ST_20160816_MISSILE16_2523819.pdf.
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private entities, but once Japan made them public again it solidified Tokyo’s claim to the islands.
This led to violent protests in dozens of Chinese cities by nationalists who threatened the
Japanese embassy, causing a diplomatic crisis.49 The issue is still largely unresolved, as both
nations avoid international arbitration for fear of an unfavorable ruling.50 Instead, China has
enacted a series of campaigns to dispute and dislodge Japan’s hold over the Diaoyus, primarily in
both the air and sea domains.
The most frequently occurring provocations occur in the air. In response to Japan
purchasing the Diaoyus as previously mentioned, China established an Air Defense Identification
Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea in 2013. According to international law, they have a right to
do so— however, the new ADIZ not only encompassed the Diaoyus but also significantly
overlapped with Japan’s pre-existing ADIZ (See Figure Five).51 The PLA Air Force regularly
conducts military practices within the zone, with the simultaneous objectives of enforcing
China’s ADIZ while destabilizing Japan’s. In 2015 alone, Chinese planes intruded into Japan’s
airspace 571 times, forcing Japan to scramble defensive jets each time— and these incidents
have only increased.52

Ian Johnson and Thom Shanker, “Beijing Mixes Messages over Anti-Japan Protests,” The New York
Times (The New York Times, September 16, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/world/asia/anti-japaneseprotests-over-disputed-islands-continue-in-china.html.
49

50
Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, “International Law’s Unhelpful Role in the Senkaku Islands,” University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 29 (4)(2008): 906–907, 928;
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol29/iss4/2/
51

Chapman, “Geopolitical Implications of the Sino-Japanese East China Sea Dispute for the U.S.,” p. 21.

Japanese Ministry of Defense, “Statistics on Scrambles through Fiscal Year 2015,” (Tokyo: Ministry of
Defense, April 22, 2016): 1, 3–4; http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2016/press_pdf/p20160422_03.pdf
52
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In the naval domain, the PRC a has maintained a permanent presence in the twenty-four
nautical mile contiguous zone off the Diaoyus every day since the spring of 2019, using armed
Coast Guard vessels converted from naval warships to sail around the archipelago, and
sometimes through Japanese territorial waters.53 Shigeo Akimoto, a former Japan Coast Guard
(JCG) vice commandant, estimates the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) intrudes on average “three
times per month with four ships, one of them armed, for an hour and a half per incident.”54
This paramilitary trend favors China, as they can impose their will around the Diaoyus.
For example, a Lao Airlines flight was turned back from Beijing in 2015 after not complying
with China’s ECS ADIZ regulations.55 In 2016 over fifteen CCG ships escorted over two
hundred Chinese civilian fishing boats around the archipelago, “demonstrating Beijing’s
capability at any time to outnumber the JCG.”56 And in May 2020, the CCG harassed a Japanese
fishing boat within Japanese territorial waters, claiming its fishing activies were illegal.57 These
specific incidents are only a small sample of a much larger body of evidence, showing how
contentious the issue is for China to devote significant military energy towards it.

Tetsuo Kotani, “China's Military and Paramilitary Activities in the East China Sea: Trends and
Assessments for the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Asia Policy 27, no. 3 (2020): p. 9, https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2020.0040
53
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Ibid., p. 9.
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Chapman, “Geopolitical Implications of the Sino-Japanese East China Sea Dispute for the U.S.,” p. 22.
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Kotani, “China's Military and Paramilitary Activities in the East China Sea” p. 9.

Tetsuo Kotani, “China Steps up Its Offensive against the Senkaku Islands,” The Japan Times, June 22,
2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/06/02/commentary/world-commentary/china-steps-offensivesenkaku-islands/#.XujoPEVKiUk.
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Relevance of the Thirty-Six Stratagems to Chinese Strategy in the Diaoyus
The Diaoyus are but one facet of China’s current maritime strategy in the East China Sea.
As mentioned previously, China’s consistent security concern is its Eastern coast and naval
vulnerabilities. As such, Beijing is seeking to expand its “interior control over its Near Seas to
eventually achieve a level of continental control it believes it needs to enhance its security
interests.”58 Peter Dutton, a strategic researcher at the U.S. Naval War College, characterizes
China’s actions as “non-militarized coercion.”59 This does not mean that the military is not
involved— as mentioned, China’s ADIZ and Coast Guard incursions are frequent. Instead, “the
military’s role is indirect as part of the escalation control mechanism that China uses to not
provoke conflict…as it pursues its objectives.”60 Ultimately, China is carefully manipulating its
levers of national power to achieve its ends without provoking the ire of the U.S.; an approach
which should evoke the craftiness of the Thirty-Six Stratagems.
The stratagems are part and parcel of this approach, and are especially useful given that
they are intended for use during situations such as these. The Thirty-Six Stratagems are aimed at
deviating from the routine, using cunning, and orienting the user towards inventive problemsolving— an apt description for China’s approach to the Diaoyus. Due to the adaptive nature of
the stratagems, there are multiple sayings which could be invoked to explain China’s actions. In
much the same way, the Chinese strategy is multifaceted; involving aerial, naval, and diplomatic
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approaches. Due to the scope of the issue, this thesis will focus on examining the naval activities
of the PRC in the contested waters, using the first Stratagem: “Cross the Sea by Deceiving the
Sky.”61
Examination of Chinese Naval Activities through the First Stratagem
In developing this case study, clear parameters for analysis must be first be established.
As previously mentioned, only naval incursions by the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) or People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will be examined. There are three primary tactics employed by
China— CCG incursions into the waters surrounding or adjacent to the Diaoyus, fishing
incursions in violation of Japan’s fishing boundaries, and PLAN vessels sailing past Japanese
defenses in the Diaoyus and adjacent islands.
Before advancing this case study, however, the particulars of the first stratagem must be
discussed. In doing so, there are a few translation variants which must be addressed. A strict
translation of the original, and the most commonly used, is phrased “Crossing the sea while
deceiving the heaven.”62 An alternative translation reads “Deceive the emperor and cross the
sea,” and the difference in the two can be attributed to the Chinese tradition of deifying their
rulers. Some Chinese authors will refer to the heavens in reference to the revered position of the
Emperor, thus the ambiguity.63
As previously mentioned, the stratagems are written using only four Mandarin characters,
thus their brevity and occasional opacity. However, this stratagem references an ancient Chinese
folk tale; one instantly familiar to native readers. From this tale the intended meaning of the
61
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stratagem can be inferred. During the reign of the Tang dynasty, Emperor Taizong launched a
military offensive against the proto-Korean kingdom of Koguryo. To do so, the Chinese army
would need to sail across the Yellow Sea. However, Emperor Taizong was afraid of seasickness
and so intended on cancelling the campaign. His general, Xue Rengui, was devoted to the
offensive and so devised to trick the Emperor. General Xue invited him to a banquet, and entered
through a dark tunnel into a great hall, where they dined for several days. After the feast ended,
the Emperor noticed the sound of waves, and thus realized he had been tricked into boarding a
ship bound for Korea. Upon discovering that they were nearly arrived, Emperor Taizong decided
to procede, and the campaign was successful.64 Thus, the stratagem can be more clearly
translated for the Westerner as “Deceiving the Emperor [by inviting him to a house by the sea
that is really a disguised ship] and [thus causing him to] cross the sea.”65
As with many of the stratagems, this saying encompasses a variety of applications. Most
pertinent to the Diaoyus is that of creating a blind spot in the victim’s perception of reality. As
Sinologist Herro von Senger writes, it involves the transformation of “clandestine activities into
routine procedures that are generally visible, but no longer monitored very carefully, and thus
[able to be carried out] unseen.”66 Emperor Taizong assumed he was attending a banquet, when
he was in fact sailing across the ocean. He was lulled into overlooking the indications of naval
travel by General Xue’s deception. The stratagem could also be applied to leveraging
circumstances to violate the established order, creating favorable de facto circumstances— “to
“瞒天过海” [Deceiving the heavens and crossing the sea: English translation] - English Story.
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do something that is actually quite inadmissible in front of everyone’s eyes and get away with it
scot-free.”67 To violate the Emperor’s wishes or deceive him would certainly have incurred
severe punishment in normal circumstances. However, due his trickery, General Xue was able to
escape such consequences.
With even a cursory examination of China’s maritime actions in the Diaoyus, both
applications of the first stratagem are readily apparent. In response to Chinese aggression in the
archipelago, Japan has increased its defensive posture around the island and devoted significant
financial resources to the effort.68 The Japanese Defense Force (JDF) installed coastal
observation facilities on Yonaguni Island, increased C3I capabilities, anti-ship missile batteries,
and adjusted fighter squadron postures to increase operational readiness.69 However, these
attempts at deterrence play right into China’s hand. A simple fact of the geography of the East
China Sea is that the PLAN Eastern Fleet cannot reach the greater Pacific without its ships
sailing through the waters of Japanese islands. In doing so, these navigational routes travel past
the aforementioned defenses, lending a golden opportunity for China to gather intelligence on the
operations and positions of the deterrents it faces.70 Indeed, the PRC has taken advantage of such
prospects already, as “Chinese Navy intelligence gathering vessels have repeatedly been spotted
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near the Senkaku Islands, as well as in or near other Japanese territorial waters.”71 Furthermore,
JDF doctrine demands that Japanese armed forces escort these intruders through Japan’s waters,
providing another excellent opportunity for the PLA to ascertain exactly what sort of aerial and
naval response they might one day provoke through kinetic conflict.
In addition to intelligence-gathering, China’s use of the first stratagem also has a negative
effect on the JDF. The repeated navigations through the Ryukyu chain and frequent CCG
incursions into the Diaoyus are not kinetic, but warrant a response form the JDF and Japanese
Coast Guard (JCG). Over time, these constant deployments can diminish Japan’s perception of
the risk of conflict over the Diaoyus, even as the actual threat may not change.72 Although Japan
recognizes the threat to their territorial claim and has devoted the resources necessary to contest
China’s assertive actions, these actions could have the double-edged effect of degrading the
necessary effectiveness and readiness.
The other application of the first stratagem, that of upsetting the established order by
trickery, is evident primarily through the actions of the CCG. A prime example is the previously
mentioned incident where CCG ships escorted Chinese fishing boats into the Diaoyus and
enforced their ability to fish in the waters.73 Japan, who administers the waters and determines
fishing rights, was forced to allow Chinese boats to temporarily fish in the waters. Such action on
China’s part was unacceptable under international norms, and yet Japan was forced to acquiesce
71
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like Emperor Taizong. However, unlike the Emperor, Japan might find itself forced to accept
less than favorable circumstances.
Implications for Future Policy
The significance of the Thirty-Six Stratagems to Chinese strategy in the East China Sea
should not be lost on US and Japanese policymakers. Such insight allows greater clarity into how
allied policy might be received and countered by China. For example, RAND recently proposed
four calculated measures the US and Japan could seek to implement. First, joint evaluations of
Japan’s responses to “sudden, large numbers of Chinese military aircraft flight operations” near
Japan ought to occur.74 Second, joint dialogue of reprioritization of JDF assets to the Ryukyus
should take place during discussions of US force realignment.75 Third, the US should assist Japan
in evolving their scramble and escort protocols to preserve resources while still facing threats
from Chinese incursions.76 Finally, RAND proposed joint military exercises in the East China
Sea “timed to the Chinese political calendar… that could make [China] appear ineffectual in
comparison.”77
These are well-balanced measures which equip Japan to respond to China’s actions
without drawing the US into the conflict. However, policymakers should avoid the trap of
calculating policy solely through a Western framework. As demonstrated, China’s actions are
through-and-through Eastern, not just influenced by the stratagems but similar literature as well.
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Failing to understand China’s actions in their Chinese context fundamentally increases the risk of
miscalculation, possibly leading to unintended consequences. For example, an alteration of JDF
scramble and escort protocols could be perceived as proof of success by Beijing. Having
successfully altered the status quo to one advantageous to them and draining to Japan, China
might increase the number of instigating aerial operations, invalidating the measures taken by the
allies.
Analyses like the ones performed in this thesis are invaluable as the US and the Western
order are challenged by revisionist powers like China. Indeed, further study into the influence of
the Thirty-Six Stratagems on Chinese strategy writ large must be conducted. However, study
itself will not provide enough to contain China’s ambitions. It must be integrated into how the
West views China’s actions and thus into policymaking. The true power of the Thirty-Six
Stratagems often lies not in the exceptional cunning of the user, but in the ignorance of the
victim.
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